Abstract: In this paper we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem for Nash equilibrium payoffs. For this end the problem is described equivalently by a stochastic differential game with jumps. But, however, unlike the work by Buckdahn, Hu and Li [8] , here the important tool of a dynamic programming principle for stopping times has to be developed. Moreover, we prove that the lower and upper value functions are the viscosity solutions of the associated coupled systems of PDEs of Isaacs type, respectively. Our results generalize those by Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6] and by Lin [14] .
Introduction
The objective of this paper is to study Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games (SDGs, for short) with jumps and coupled nonlinear cost functionals. Since the pioneering paper of Fleming and Souganidis [10] , SDGs have been studied by many authors. For instance, recently, Buckdahn and Li [9] investigated zero-sum two-player SDGs with nonlinear cost functionals using a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE, for short) approach. Unlike Fleming and Souganidis [10] they allow the controls to depend on the past and prove with a Girsanov transformation argument that the priori random value functions are deterministic. Buckdahn, Hu and Li [8] extended the approach developed in [9] to SDGs with jumps, while Biswas [4] investigated two-player zero-sum SDGs with jump diffusion in the framework of Fleming and Souganidis [10] . The reader interested in other approaches can be also referred to Hamadène [11] and the references therein.
In nonzero-sum SDGs, Hamadène, Lepeltier and Peng [12] obtained the existence of a Nash equilibrium point for nonzero sum SDGs with the help of BSDEs. Bessoussan and Frehse [3] obtained Nash equilibrium payoffs for SDGs by using parabolic partial differential equations. But both methods rely heavily on the assumption of the non degeneracy diffusion of the coefficient and it is independent of controls. Buckdahn, Cardaliaguet and Rainer [6] got rid of the strong assumptions on the diffusion coefficient. Lin [14] generalizes the result in [6] by investigating Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzerosum SDGs with nonlinear cost functionals. Lasry and Lions [13] studied mean field games, i.e., stochastic control of many agent systems where agents are coupled via their costs. Motivated by the above results, we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for SDGs with coupled nonlinear cost functionals, i.e., the both players do not only influence mutually their cost functionals in the choice of their control processes, but also their gain processes.
In [14] , the cost functionals of the both players are defined by a system of decoupled BSDEs, the both players influence mutually their cost functionals only by the choice of their control processes. An open problem was that how to study SDGs whose cost functionals are defined by two coupled BSDEs, i.e, SDGs with coupled nonlinear cost functionals. This is the objective of the paper.
Let us be more precise now: The dynamics of our two-player nonzero-sum SDG is given by the process N t,i and the following doubly controlled stochastic system: where {B t } t≥0 is a d-dimensional standard Wiener process, {N t } t≥0 is a Poisson process independent of {B t } t≥0 , and F is the filtration generated by B and N . For 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T, i = 1, 2, we let N t,i s = m(i + N s − N t ), where m(j) = 1, if j is odd, and m(j) = 2, if j is even. The control u = {u} s∈[t,T ] (resp., v = {v} s∈ [t,T ] ) is supposed to be F-predictable and takes its values in a compact metric space U (resp., V ). The set of these controls is denoted by U t,T (resp., V t,T ). We shall give its assumptions on b and σ in the next section.
We define our nonlinear cost functionals by introducing a system of two coupled BSDEs: 
where ( i Y t,x;u,v , i Z t,x;u,v , i H t,x;u,v ), i = 1, 2, is the unique solution of (1.1). Note the special form of f 1 and f 2 , which is related with our approach. The general case of f i not depending on i H is still open. In our framework, in opposite to zero-sum SDGs, nonzero-sum SDGs are of the type of "NAD strategy against NAD strategy": an NAD strategy is a measurable, nonanticipative mapping α : V t,T → U t,T for the 1 th player (resp., β : U t,T → V t,T for the 2 nd player) and has a delay (The definition will be introduced in next section). The set of all such NAD strategies for the 1 th player is denoted by A t,T (resp., for the 2 nd player B t,T ).
For (α, β) ∈ A t,T × B t,T , there exists a unique couple of controls (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v). This allows to define J i (t, x; α, β) := J i (t, x; u, v), as well as the value functions of the two-player zero-sum SDG associated with J i , i = 1, 2, the lower value function
We note that, since the BSDEs (1.1) are coupled, the values of the two-player zero-sum SDGs are also coupled.
In our approach we need a probabilistic interpretation of coupled systems of Hamilton-JacobiBellman-Isaacs equations: A first result of our paper is that the value functions U = (U 1 , U 2 ) and W = (W 1 , W 2 ) are viscosity solutions of the following coupled Isaacs equations: ∂ ∂t U i (t, x) + H + i (t, x, U 1 (t, x), U 2 (t, x), DU i (t, x), D 2 U i (t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n , U i (T, x) = Φ i (x), i = 1, 2, and ∂ ∂t W i (t, x) + H − i (t, x, W 1 (t, x), W 2 (t, x), DW i (t, x), D 2 W i (t, x)) = 0, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n , W i (T, x) = Φ i (x), i = 1, 2, respectively, where, for (t, x, y 1 , y 2 , p, A, u, v)
H i (t, x, y 1 , y 2 , p, A, u, v) = 1 2 tr(σσ T (t, x, u, v)A) + pb(t, x, u, v) + f i (t, x, y 1 , y 2 , pσ(t, x, u, v), u, v), A crucial step in the proof of these results is to obtain dynamic programming principles for stopping times: i.e., for any stopping time τ with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ T, x ∈ R n , i = 1, 2, where i G t,x;α,β t,τ
1. Both companies try to maximize their payoff which can be different. Since the financial market is not so quick in reacting to the moves of both companies, both companies have to use strategies with delays. The above described problem is a nonzero-sum stochastic differential game.
The main results of our paper concern the existence and a characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs for our games: We first obtain the characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs (see Theorem 5.7), and then get the existence of a Nash equilibrium payoff (see Theorem 5.10) .
Let us explain what is new and which difficulties are related with. In comparison with [6] and [14] , the first difficulty was to get a dynamic programming principle for a system of two coupled BSDEs. To overcome this difficulty, we associate with this system an auxiliary one which cost functionals coincide with ours. This leads to the new problem: we need a dynamic programming principle for this system not only for deterministic but also for stopping times. The method used in Buckdahn and Hu [7] to get for control problems the dynamic programming principle for stopping times is not applicable anymore, because in the framework of SDGs the monotonicity argument used in [7] doesn't work anymore. To overcome this new difficulty, we develop an argument to obtain the time continuity of the value functions, which in return is used to obtain the dynamic programming principle for stopping times from the the dynamic programming principle for deterministic times. Another technical difficulty comes from the fact that we study here nonzero-sum SDGs and not zero-sum SDGs. In order to give both players symmetric tools, they have to use "strategies with delay against strategies with delay" and not only "strategies against controls" as in [9] . Finally, comparing to our previous work [14] , the presence of jump terms adds a supplementary complexity.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce some notations and recall some basics of BSDEs with jumps, which will be needed in what follows. Section 3 introduces the setting of SDGs and studies the dynamic programming principle for stopping times. Section 4 gives a probabilistic interpretation of coupled systems of Isaacs equations. In Section 5 we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum SDGs. An existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs are established. Finally, we postpone the proof of the Theorems 3.11 and 4.2 to Section 6.
Preliminaries
The objective of this section is to give some preliminaries, which will be useful in what follows. Let the underlying probability space (Ω, F, P) be the completed product of the Wiener space (Ω 1 , F 1 , P 1 ) and the Poisson space (Ω 2 , F 2 , P 2 ). As concerns the Wiener space (Ω 1 , F 1 , P 1 ): Ω 1 = C 0 (R; R d ) is the set of continuous functions from R to R d with value zero at 0, endowed with the topology generated by the uniform convergence on compacts; F 1 is the Borel σ-algebra over Ω 1 , completed by the Wiener measure P 1 under which the d-dimensional coordinate processes B s (ω) = ω s , s ∈ R + , ω ∈ Ω 1 , and B −s (ω) = ω(−s), s ∈ R + , ω ∈ Ω 1 , are two independent d-dimensional Brownian motions. We denote by {F B s , s ≥ 0} the natural filtration generated by B and augmented by all P 1 -null sets, i.e.,
Let us now introduce the Poisson space (Ω 2 , F 2 , P 2 ) as follows:
and the Probability measure P 2 can de defined over (Ω 2 , F ′ ) such that {N t } t≥0 and {N −t } t≥0 are two independent Poisson processes with intensity λ. Let us denote F 2 by the completion of F ′ with respect to the probability P 2 andḞ
and
∨ N P 2 , t ≥ 0, augmented by the P 2 -null sets. Moreover, we put
where F is completed with respect to P 2 , and the filtration F = {F t } t≥0 is generated by
Let T > 0 be an arbitrarily fixed time horizon. We denote by N t = N t − λt, for all t ≥ 0. For any n ≥ 1, we denote by |z| the Euclidean norm of z ∈ R n . We introduce the following spaces of stochastic processes.
•
Let us consider the following BSDE with data (f, ξ): 
(H3) There exists a constant K > −1 such that, for all (t, y, z,
We note that a Poisson process is a special case of a Poisson random measure. For this, we can take as the compensator ν(ds, de) = λdsδ 1 (de), where
We have the following existence and uniqueness theorem of BSDE (2.1). For its proof we refer the reader to Tang and Li [18] .
Lemma 2.1. Let the assumptions (H1) and (H2) hold. Then, for all ξ ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R), BSDE (2.1) has a unique solution (y, z, k) ∈ S 2 (0,
We have the following comparison theorem for solutions of BSDEs (2.1), which is proved with the help of standard arguments (see Royer [17] ). Lemma 2.2. Let us denote by (y 1 , z 1 , k 1 ) and (y 2 , z 2 , k 2 ) the solutions of BSDEs with data (f 1 , ξ 1 ) and (f 2 , ξ 2 ), respectively. Moreover, if ξ 1 , ξ 2 ∈ L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R), and f 1 and f 2 satisfy the assumptions (H1), (H2) and (H3), and the following holds
and (H2), we let, for i = 1, 2,
where ϕ i ∈ H 2 (0, T ; R). If ξ 1 and ξ 2 are in L 2 (Ω, F T , P; R), then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3. Let us denote by (y 1 , z 1 , k 1 ) and (y 2 , z 2 , k 2 ) the solutions of BSDE (2.1) with the data (ξ 1 , f 1 ) and (ξ 2 , f 2 ), respectively. Then the following holds: for all t ∈ [0, T ],
Here β ≥ 2 + 2C + 4C 2 , where C is the Lipschitz constant in (H1).
For the proof, the readers can be referred to Barles, Buckdahn and Pardoux [1] .
Stochastic differential games with jumps
In this section, we first introduce nonzero-sum SDGs, and then we define the value functions and show that they have a deterministic version. Finally, we state the dynamic programming principle for stopping times, which is crucial for the next section. Let U (resp., V) be the set of admissible control processes for the first (resp., second) player, i.e., the set of all U (resp., V )-valued F-predictable processes. We suppose that the control state spaces U and V are compact metric spaces.
For given admissible controls u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we consider the following stochastic differential equation (SDE): for t ∈ [0, T ] and ζ ∈ L 2 (Ω, F t , P; R n ),
where
satisfy the following assumptions:
(i) For every fixed x ∈ R n , b(., x, ., .), and σ(., x, ., .) are continuous in (t, u, v).
(ii) There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all t
From (H4) we know that there exists some C > 0 such that, for all 0
It is well known that under (H4), for any u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, SDE (3.1) has a unique strong solution. Furthermore, we have the following estimates for the solution of SDE (3.1) (e.g., see [8] ).
Proposition 3.1. Let the assumption (H4) hold. Then, for p ≥ 2, there exists a positive constant
, we make the following assumptions:
The following system of two coupled BSDEs will define the cost functionals of the game associated with (3.1).
where X t,x;u,v is the solution of equation (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ R n . Under the assumption (H5), from Tang and Li [18] we know that equation (3. 3) has a unique solution. For given control processes u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V, we introduce now the associated cost functional for the i th player, i = 1, 2,
is the solution of (3.3).
In the above definition we generalize the framework studied by Lin [14] . Indeed, in [14] we studied cost functionals defined by a decoupled system of BSDEs, while now the both BSDEs are coupled: the both players do not only influence mutually their cost functionals in the choice of their control processes, but also their gain processes i Y t,x;u,v , i = 1, 2. With an argument introduced in Pardoux, Pradeilles and Rao [15] we can transfer the coupled system of BSDEs into a decoupled system of BSDEs. N ((t, s] )), where m(j) = 1, if j is odd, and m(j) = 2, if j is even.
and we consider the following controlled decoupled BSDEs with jumps:
Since f i , i = 1, 2, are Lipschitz in (x, y, z), uniformly with respect to (t, u, v), it is easy to check that also the coefficients f i , i = 1, 2, have this property. From Lemma 2.1 we know that the above BSDE has a unique solution. In what follows we choose the intensity λ > 0 such that K − λ > −1. It follows from Lemma 2.2 that the comparison theorem for the BSDE (3.4) holds. Moreover, we also have the following propositions. 
Proof. We consider the solution ( i Y t,x;u,v , i Z t,x;u,v , i H t,x;u,v ), i = 1, 2, of equation (3.3) and, suppressing for simplicity the superscript (t, x, u, v), we put
On the other hand, analysing the jump hight of 1Ŷ at τ 1 , we get
s Y τ 1 . By iterating this argument and arguing in a similar way for i = 2, we complete the proof. Indeed, from the uniqueness of BSDE (3.4) 
From standard BSDEs estimates we have the following: Proposition 3.3. There exists some constant C > 0 such that, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ T, x, x ′ ∈ R n , u(·) ∈ U and v(·) ∈ V,
Let us now introduce subspaces of admissible controls and give the definition of NAD strategies. For later applications this has to be done for games over stochastic intervals. Let σ, τ be two stopping times such that t ≤ σ ≤ τ ≤ T.
Definition 3.4. The space U σ,τ (resp., V σ,τ ) of admissible controls for the 1 th player (resp., the 2 nd player) over the given stochastic time interval [[σ, τ ] ] is defined as the space of all processes {u r , σ ≤ r ≤ τ } (resp., {v r , σ ≤ r ≤ τ }), such that, for u 0 ∈ U , the process {u r 1 [σ,τ ] 
are F-predictable and take its values in U (resp., V ). 1) α is a nonanticipative strategy, i.e., for every F-stopping time τ ′ on Ω with σ ≤ τ ′ ≤ τ, and for all
2) α is a strategy with delay, i.e., for all v ∈ V σ,τ , there exists an increasing sequence of stopping times
s., such that, for all Γ ∈ F σ and for all n ≥ 1 and v, v ′ ∈ V σ,τ , it holds:
We denote the collection of all such NAD strategies for the 1 th player by A σ,τ . We can define all NAD strategies β : U σ,τ → V σ,τ for the 2 nd player symmetrically and denote the set of them by B σ,τ .
We have the following lemma, which turns out to be useful in what follows. Since the proof of this lemma is similar to that in Lin [14] , we omit it here. Lemma 3.6. For (α, β) ∈ A σ,τ × B σ,τ , there exists a unique couple of admissible control processes
For (α, β) ∈ A t,T × B t,T , it follows from Lemma 3.6 that there exists a unique couple of controls (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that (α(v), β(u)) = (u, v). In this sense, we define
and J i (t, x; α, β) := J i (t, x; u, v). This definition allows, in particular, to define the value functions W i and U i of the game: For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , we put
The functions W i and U i , i = 1, 2, are called the lower and upper value functions, respectively. Observe that, according to the definition of esssup and essinf over a uniformly essentially bounded family of F t -measurable random variables, both W i (t, x) and U i (t, x) are a priori elements of L ∞ (Ω, F t , P). However, we will prove that they are deterministic.
Proposition 3.7. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then, for any (t,
This proposition allows to identify
, respectively, i = 1, 2. The proposition follows then by the following two lemmas. The following lemma indicates that W i is invariant by a sufficiently large class of transformations on Ω.
of τ is equivalent to the underlying probability measure P,
Even if the formulation of of the lemma is the same as in [8] , the proof is more difficult here. Indeed, in [8] games of the type "strategy again control" were studied, while we investigate here games of the type "NAD strategy against NAD strategy".
Proof. : We give the proof in four steps:
Step 1:
The proof follows closely from the arguments in [8] or [9] and is therefore omitted.
Step 2:
We only give the proof for β, since we can use a similar argument for α. From the definition of β we know that β maps U t,T into V t,T .
(1) β is a nonanticipative strategy. Indeed, let σ : Ω → [t, T ] be an F-stopping time and
, the assumptions i) and ii) imply that σ(τ −1 ) is still an F-stopping time. Obviously, we have
(2) β is a strategy with delay. Since β is a nonanticipative strategy with delay, we have, for all u ∈ U t,T , the existence of an increasing sequence of stopping times
s., such that, for all Γ ∈ F t and for all n ≥ 1 and u, u ′ ∈ U t,T , it holds:
It is easy to check that β is a nonanticipative strategy with delay. Moreover, since β(u) = β(u(τ ))(τ −1 ), u ∈ U t,T , we have that { β | β ∈ B t,T } = B t,T . Ditto for α.
Step 3: The following holds:
Taking into account the properties of τ , this relation can be proven in the same manner as the corresponding relation in [9] , also see [5] .
Step 4: We now show that
Step 2, α(v(τ )) = u(τ ) and β(u(τ )) = v(τ ), and, thus, from
Step 1,
Thus, since { α | α ∈ A t,T } = A t,T and { β | β ∈ B t,T } = B t,T , we conclude with Step 3,
We get the wished result.
For ℓ ≥ 1, let us define the transformation τ ℓ : Ω → Ω such that
We now recall the notion of stochastic backward semigroups, which was first introduced by Peng [16] to study stochastic optimal control problems, and translated later by Buckdahn and Li [9] to SDGs. For any stopping times σ, τ , with t ≤ σ ≤ τ ≤ T , and a random variable η ∈ L 2 (Ω, F τ , P; R), we define
) t≤s≤τ is the solution of the following BSDE:
where X t,x;u,v is the solution of SDE (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ R n .
We have the following dynamic programming principle (DPP) over a stochastic interval for our games.
Theorem 3.11. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then the following dynamic programming principle holds: For any stopping time τ with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ T, x ∈ R n , i = 1, 2,
This DPP for stopping times will play a crucial role in Section 4. Since the proof is rather long and technical, we postpone it to Subsection 6.1.
Probabilistic interpretation of associated coupled systems of Isaacs equations
The objective of this section is to give a probabilistic interpretation of coupled systems of Isaacs equations. More precisely, we show that the value functions U = (U 1 , U 2 ) and W = (W 1 , W 2 ), introduced in Section 3, are viscosity solutions of the following coupled Isaacs equations:
respectively, where for (t, x, y 1 ,
Let us recall the definition of a viscosity solution of the system (4.1). We denote by C 3 l,b ([0, T ] × R n ) the set of real-valued functions which are continuously differentiable up to third order and whose derivatives of order from 1 to 3 are bounded.
(ii) a viscosity supersolution of the system (4.1) if
(iii) a viscosity solution of the system (4.1) if it is both a viscosity subsolution and a supersolution of the system (4.1). In the same way we can define a viscosity solution of the system (4.2).
We now give the main result in this section. We shall give the proof in Section 6.2 since it is rather lengthy.
Theorem 4.2. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then
is a viscosity solution of the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)).
To state a uniqueness theorem for the viscosity solution of the system (4.1), let us first define the following space:
Theorem 4.3. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then there exists at most one viscosity solution u ∈ Θ (resp., v ∈ Θ) of the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)).
The proof of the Theorem can be adapted from the arguments in Barles, Buckdahn and Pardoux [1] combined with those of Barles and Imbert [2] to our framework. We omit it here.
is the unique viscosity solution in Θ of the system (4.1) (resp., (4.2)).
An immediate consequence of this remark is that, under Isaacs condition:
the upper value and lower value functions coincide:
However, for the next section, we need, in addition to the value functions we have already introduced, also the following ones. For all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , i = 1, 2, we define 
Remark 4.7. By virtue of a similar argument in Sections 3 and 4 we can get, for i = 1, 2, U i and W i have the similar properties to U i and W i , respectively. We omit them here. But we will use them in Section 5.
Remark 5.1. Not only Hamiltonians of the form 
We also define the following function: for j = 1, 2, l = 1, 2,
We now give the definition of Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum SDGs, which is similar to that in [6] and [14] .
Remark 5.3. We notice that unlike in [6] our cost functionals J j (t, x; α, β), j = 1, 2, are not necessarily deterministic. Indeed, while [6] is based on the approach by Fleming and Souganidis [10] in which the admissible cost functionals for a game over the fixed time interval [t, T ] are independent of F t , the present paper is based on the approaches developed in [9] , [5] and in [8] .
The following equivalent condition of (5.2) follows easily from Lemma 3.6.
Lemma 5.4. For any ε > 0, let (α ε , β ε ) ∈ A t,T × B t,T . Then (5.2) holds if and only if, for all
As in [14] , before giving the characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs, we first state two important lemmas.
for all stopping time τ ∈ [t, T ] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ A t,T such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
(ii) for all stopping time τ ∈ [t, T ] and ε > 0, there exists an NAD strategy α ∈ A t,T such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
Proof. Let us only give the proof of (i); that of (ii) can be carried out with a similar argument. We notice that V τ,T can be regarded as a subset of B τ,T . Indeed, putting β v ′ (u ′ ) = v ′ , u ′ ∈ U τ,T , we associate all v ′ ∈ V τ,T with some β v ′ ∈ B τ,T . Therefore, for any y ∈ R n , similar to Proposition 6.13 we have
Then, for any ε 0 > 0, by standard arguments we have the existence of α y ∈ A τ,T such that
Then α : V t,T → U t,T is an NAD strategy. This can be checked in a straight-forward way and is omitted in order to shorten the proof. By virtue of Proposition 3.10, Remark 4.7, (5.4) and (5.5), we deduce that, for v ∈ V t,T ,
Consequently, due to Proposition 3.3 we conclude
where C is a constant which can be different from line to line and is independent of v ∈ V t,T .
Recalling that ε 0 > 0 hasn't been specified yet, let us choose ε 0 = C −1 ε. We observe that
Then we deduce that
This conclude the proof.
The following lemma follows from standard estimates for SDEs.
Lemma 5.6. There exists a positive constant C such that, for all (u, v), (u ′ , v ′ ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T , and for all F-stopping times σ :
, P − a.s., we have the following estimate: for all real r ∈ [t, T ],
Let us now give the following characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum SDGs.
2 ) ∈ R 2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at point (t, x) if and only if, for all ε > 0, there exists a couple (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T ×V t,T such that for all δ ∈ [0, T −t] and j = 1, 2,
Remark 5.8. The characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium payoffs in [14] generalizes the results in [6] from classical cost functionals without running cost to nonlinear cost functionals with running cost defined by decoupled BSDEs. The above theorem on its part extends the result in [14] : on one hand, we generalize [14] from SDGs without jumps to those with jumps. On the other hand, our cost functionals are defined by a system of two coupled BSDEs.
Proof of Theorem 5.7: Necessity of (5.6) and (5.7).
Proof. Let us suppose that (e 1 , e 2 ) ∈ R 2 is a Nash equilibrium payoff at the point (t, x). Then, by Definition 5.2 we have, for sufficiently small ε > 0, the existence of (α ε , β ε ) ∈ A t,T × B t,T such that, for all (α, β) ∈ A t,T × B t,T
Since (α ε , β ε ) ∈ A t,T × B t,T , it follows from Lemma 3.6 that there exists a unique couple (
We notice that from Proposition 3.2, (5.6) is equivalent to
We make the proof by contradiction and suppose that (5.6) doesn't hold true. Then, for all ε ′ > 0, there exists some ε ∈ (0, ε ′ ) and some δ ∈ [0, T − t] such that, for some j ∈ {1, 2}, say for j = 1, 11) and applying Lemma 5.5 to u ε and t + δ, we have the existence of an NAD strategy α ∈ A t,T such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
From Lemma 3.6 we have the existence of a unique couple (u, v) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that α(v) = u, β ε (u) = v. From (5.12) we see that u = u ε on [t, t + δ], and we put
Consequently, from the nonanticipativity of β ε ∈ B t,T we see that
, and for all s ∈ [t + δ, T ],
as well as
Thus,
By virtue of Lemma 2.2 and (5.12) we conclude
Therefore, from (5.11) we deduce that
let us consider the following BSDE:
In order to simplify the notations we suppose until the end of this proof that the dimension of the Brownian motion d is equal to 1, since we can use a similar arguments for d > 1. Let us set
Then we conclude
(5.14)
Let us put, for r ∈ [t, t + δ],
Then, from (H5) we deduce that |a r | ≤ C, |b r | ≤ C, |c r | ≤ C, and c r :
Consequently, there exists a constant ε 0 > 0 small enough, such that c r ≥ −1+ε 0 , r ∈ [t, t+δ], and BSDE (5.14) can be written as follows:
Let us put
Then from the Girsanov theorem we know that there exists a probability measure Q = M t,t+δ · P defined on (Ω, F) such that
is an (F, Q)-martingale, and
is an (F, Q)-Brownian motion, and both are independent under Q. Therefore, (5.15) takes the following form:
By applying Itô's formula to y s e s t
ardr we obtain
Thanks to the Hölder inequality we have 
for some suitably chosen constant C 0 > 0. Consequently, putting
we have
Thus, since
we obtain
Therefore, (5.13) yields
Let us choose ε ′ sufficiently small such that ε ′3 2 C 0 > ε ′4 . Then we have ε 3 2 C 0 > ε 4 . Since P(∆) > 0, we have a contradiction with (5.8) for α(·) = u. The proof is complete.
Proof of Theorem 5.7: Sufficiency of (5.6) and (5.7).
Proof. We fix arbitrarily ε > 0. For ε 0 > 0 being specified later let us assume that (u ε 0 , v ε 0 ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T satisfies (5.6) and (5.7), i.e., for all s ∈ [t, T ] and j = 1, 2,
where we use Proposition 3.2 for getting the first inequality. Let us put t i = t+i
, where m will be specified at the end of the proof of Lemma 5.9. Let us apply Lemma 5.5 to u ε 0 and τ = t 1 , · · · , t m , successively. Then, for ε 1 > 0 (ε 1 depends on ε and is specified later) we have the existence of NAD strategies α i ∈ A t,T , i = 1, · · · , m, such that, for all v ∈ V t,T ,
For all v ∈ V t,T , let us define
Here we denote by λ the Lebesgue measure on the real line R. Then, S v and t v are stopping times, and
Then α ε is an NAD strategy, and by virtue of (5.18) we obtain
Let us admit the following lemma for the moment; we shall prove it after.
Lemma 5.9. For all ε > 0 and v ∈ V t,T ,
By a similar argument as that for Lemma 5.9 we can construct β ε ∈ B t,T such that, for all u ∈ U t,T ,
From the latter both inequalities, (5.17) and Lemma 5.4 it follows that (α ε , β ε ) satisfies Definition 5.2. Consequently, (e 1 , e 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Proof of Lemma 5.9: From (5.19) and the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 we get the existence of a positive constant C such that
From Proposition 3.10, Lemma 5.6 as well as the definitions of t v and α ε it follows that
Consequently, by virtue of Lemma 2.3 we deduce that
from which, combined with (5.20), we get
For s ∈ [t, T ], we put
Then we have
where we conclude
Similarly to (5.22) we have
Using arguments similar to those in [14] we can show that
Consequently,
Thus, from (5.21) and (5.22) we have
We can choose δ > 0, ε 0 > 0, and ε 1 > 0 such that Cε 0 + Cmε
2 ≤ ε and ε 0 < ε. Thus,
This allows us to complete the proof.
One of our main results of this section is the following existence theorem of a Nash equilibrium payoff.
Theorem 5.10. Under the Isaacs condition, there exists a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x), for all
From Theorem 5.7 we only have to prove that, for all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that (5.6) and (5.7) hold, for δ ∈ [0, T − t], j = 1, 2. The following proposition is crucial for this proof and it will be proven after.
Proposition 5.11. For all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T independent of F t such that, for all stopping time τ (t ≤ τ ≤ T ) independent of F t , j = 1, 2, (5.6) holds:
From the above proposition we immediately have the following corollary.
Corollary 5.12. For all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T independent of F t such that, for all s ∈ [t, T ], j = 1, 2, (5.6) holds:
We now give the proof of Theorem 5.10.
Proof. For ε > 0, let (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T ×V t,T be that of Corollary 5.12. Then (5.6) holds. By noticing that (u ε , v ε ) is independent of F t we see that J j (t, x; u ε , v ε ), j = 1, 2, are deterministic and (J 1 (t, x; u ε , v ε ), J 2 (t, x; u ε , v ε )), ε > 0 is a bounded sequence. Therefore, we can choose an accumulation point of this sequence, as ε → 0, and we denote this point by (e 1 , e 2 ). Consequently, from Theorem 5.7 it follows that (e 1 , e 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium payoff at (t, x). The proof is complete.
Before proving Proposition 5.11, let us first make some preliminaries for its proof.
Lemma 5.13. For all ε > 0, δ ∈ [0, T − t] and x ∈ R n , we have the existence of (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T independent of F t , such that, j = 1, 2,
For its proof, we adapt the ideas developed in [14] from SDGs without jumps to SDGs with jumps.
Proof. We denote by F t = (F t s ) s∈[t,T ] the following filtration:
where N P is the collection of all P-null sets. For s ∈ [t, T ], we denote by U t s,T (resp., V t s,T ) the set of F t -adapted processes {u r } r∈[s,T ] (resp., {v r } r∈[s,T ] ) taking their values in U (resp., V ), and we let A t s,T (resp., B t s,T ) be the NAD strategies from V t s,T into U t s,T (resp., U t s,T into V t s,T ). For j = 1, 2, it follows from the Sections 3 and 4 that W j restricted to [t, T ] × R n and W j are inside the class of continuous functions with linear growth and the unique viscosity solutions of the same system of Isaacs equations. Therefore,
By virtue of the dynamic programming principle for W j and V t t,t+δ ⊂ B t t,t+δ we deduce that Therefore, for ε > 0 and δ > 0, we have the existence of α ε ∈ A t t,t+δ such that, for all v ∈ V t t,t+δ ,
By a symmetric argument there exists β ε ∈ B t t,t+δ such that, for all u ∈ U t t,t+δ ,
In analogy to Lemma 3.6, it can be shown that there exists a unique couple (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t t,t+δ × V t t,t+δ
This completes the proof.
Also the following Lemma is crucial for the proof of Proposition 5.11.
Lemma 5.14. For n ≥ 1, we fix some partition t = t 0 < t 1 < · · · < t n = T of the interval [t, T ]. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T independent of F t , such that, for all i = 0, · · · , n − 1 and j = 1, 2,
Proof. Let us prove it by induction. Obviously, due to the above lemma, it holds for i = 0. Let a couple (u ε , v ε ) independent of F t , be constructed on the interval [t, t i ), and we shall give its definition on [t i , t i+1 ). By virtue of the above lemma we have, for all y ∈ R n , the existence of (u y , v y ) ∈ U t i ,T × V t i ,T independent of F t , such that,
For j = 1, 2, y, z ∈ R n and s ∈ [t i , t i+1 ], let us set
)], and y
Then let us consider the following associated BSDEs:
From Lemma 2.3 it follows that
Thus, due to Proposition 3.10 and (5.23) we obtain, for C|y − z| ≤ ε 2 ,
We let
Let us define
from which we conclude the wished result.
Let us come, finally, to the proof of Proposition 5.11.
Proof. Let j = 1, 2 be arbitrarily fixed, and let τ be a stopping time independent of F t , such that
It is obvious that 0 ≤ τ n − τ ≤ 2 −n . From Lemma 5.14 we know that, for all ε > 0, there exists (u ε , v ε ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T independent of F t such that, for all stopping time τ independent of F t , and for all i (0 ≤ i ≤ 2 n − 1),
where ε 0 > 0 depends on ε and n, and will be specified after. From the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 it follows that, for 0 ≤ i ≤ 2 n − 1,
from where
for ε 0 = ε C2 n+1 , where
and we put, for s ∈ [τ, τ n ],
Obviously, (y 1 s ) s∈ [τ,τn] is the solution of the following BSDE:
We will compare y 1 with the process constant in time
We observe that (y 2 , z 2 ) is the solution of a BSDE which driving coefficient equals to zero and z 2 = 0. Hence, from Lemma 2.3 it follows that
where we have used the boundedness of f i , i = 1, 2. By virtue of the Propositions 3.10 and 6.12 we deduce that
where C > 0 is a constant which depends on x. Therefore, from (5.27) it follows that
) we see that I 1 ≥ 0. Therefore, by the above inequality we have
where we choose n such that 4C2 −n ≤ ε 3 , i.e., n ≥ (2 + ln C − 3 ln ε ln 2 ), and from (5.26) we deduce
Since (u ε , v ε ) as well as τ are independent of F t , the event
) is independent of F t , from which we see that the conditional probability P(
) coincides with its probability. Consequently,
The proof is complete.
6 Proof of the Theorems 3.11 and 4.2
In this section we still use the notations in Sections 3 and 4.
Proof of Theorem 3.11
We have postponed to this section the proof of the DPP. We shall establish it first for deterministic times, then we deduce the general version for stopping times.
6.1.1 Dynamic programming principle for deterministic times Theorem 6.1. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), the following dynamic programming principle (DPP) holds: For any 0 ≤ t < t + δ ≤ T, x ∈ R n , i = 1, 2,
is the value function of the stochastic differential game which dynamics is given by the process (X t,x;u,v , N t,i ), and which cost functional is defined by our BSDE (3.4). The DPP for games with jumps but of the type "strategy against control" was proved in [8] , and before, in another framework by Biswas [4] . However, unlike [8] we have to deal here with games of the type "NAD strategy against NAD strategy".
Proof. For arbitrarily fixed i = 1, 2, we only give the proof for W i (t, x), since for U i (t, x) we can use a symmetric argument. Let us denote by W δ (t, x) the right hand side of (6.1). Using the arguments in Proposition 3.7 we can show that W δ (t, x) is deterministic. We split now the proof into the following two lemmas.
Proof. From the definition of W δ (t, x) it follows that
For any ε > 0, let us put
Obviously, {Λ n , n ≥ 1} is an (Ω, F t )-partition. We define α ε 1 := n≥1 1 Λn α 1 n , then by straight-forward proof it can be shown that α ε 1 belongs to A t,t+δ . We let et (u n , v n ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T be associated with (α 1 n , β 1 ) by Lemma 3.6, and put
Then straight forward arguments allow to verify that (u ε 1 , v ε 1 ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T is associated with (α ε , β 1 ) by Lemma 3.6 such that
Consequently, the uniqueness of the FBSDE and the definition of NAD strategies allows to show that, for all β 1 ∈ B t,t+δ ,
Therefore, for all β 1 ∈ B t,t+δ ,
We let {O j } j≥1 ⊂ B(R n ) be a partition of R n such that
Then, from the definition of W k (t + δ, y), k = 1, 2, it follows (through a procedure already used above) that there exists α j,k 2 ∈ A t+δ,T such that, for all β 2 ∈ B t+δ,T ,
Therefore, for all β 2 ∈ B t+δ,T ,
For β ∈ B t,T and u 2 ∈ U t+δ,T , we let
. Then β 1 ∈ B t,t+δ . Notice that β 1 doesn't depend on u 2 thanks to the nonanticipativity of β. Since (α ε 1 , β 1 ) ∈ A t,t+δ × B t,t+δ , we know from Lemma 3.6 that there exists a unique pair
Since α ε 1 ∈ A t,t+δ and α ε 2 ∈ A t+δ,T are NAD strategies, α ε is also an NAD strategy. From Proposition 3.10 it follows that
which together with (6.3), (6.4) and Lemma 2.2 yields
It follows from (6.4) and the Lemmas 2.2, 2.3 and 3.6 that
Consequently, due to the choice of α ε we conclude
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 6.1 we have to prove the converse inequality.
Proof. For an arbitrarily given α ∈ A t,T and a given v 2 (·) ∈ V t+δ,T , let us define
where 
For any ε > 0, n ≥ 1, we let
Then, {Λ n } is a partition of (Ω, F t ). We define β ε 1 := n≥1 1 Λn β 1 n , and it can be proven that β ε 1 ∈ B t,t+δ . Thanks to the uniqueness of the solution of the FBSDE we have
Indeed, this relation can be proved with an argument analogous to that for (6.2). Therefore,
Since (α 1 , β ε 1 ) ∈ A t,t+δ × B t,t+δ , by Lemma 3.6 there exists an unique pair (u ε
, v 2 ∈ V t+δ,T . For any y ∈ R n , k = 1, 2, from the definition of W k (t + δ, y) it follows that
Using the Lipschitz continuity of W k (t + δ, ·) and J k (t + δ, ·) we can prove by approximating X t,x;α 1 ,β ε 1 t+δ by a finite-valued random variable that
Therefore,
Moreover, there exists some sequence {β 2 n , n ≥ 1} ⊂ B t+δ,T such that essinf
and we set, for n ≥ 1,
Obviously, {∆ n , n ≥ 1} is a partition of (Ω, F t+δ ). Let us define
for u 1 ∈ U t,t+δ and u 2 ∈ U t+δ,T . Then, from the uniqueness for the equations (3.1) and (3.4), combined with Lemma 3.6, it follows that
which together with (6.5) yields
Consequently, by virtue of the Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 we conclude
where, for the latter equality, we have used Lemma 3.6. Indeed, letting (u ε 2 , v ε 2 ) ∈ U t+δ,T × V t+δ,T be associated with (α ε 2 , β ε 2 ) by Lemma 3.6 we have
. Recalling now the arbitrariness of α ∈ A t,T we conclude that
From the dynamic programming principle (Theorem 6.1) and standard arguments for BSDEs (see Peng [16] or Buckdahn and Li [9] ) we obtain the following proposition. Proposition 6.5. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), W (t, x) is 1 2 −Hölder continuous in t, i.e., there exists a positive constant C such that, for all x ∈ R n , t, t ′ ∈ [0, T ],
Dynamic programming principle for stopping times
The objective of this subsection is to obtain the dynamic programming principle for stopping times. For this end, we need the following proposition, which turns out to be crucial in our approach.
Proposition 6.6. For 0 ≤ t ≤ T , let τ be a stopping time such that t ≤ τ ≤ T . Then we have
Proof. We give the proof in two steps.
Step 1: For all α ∈ A t,T and an arbitrary fixed v 0 ∈ V t,τ , let us define
It is straight-forward to check that α 1 ∈ A τ,T . Since α is nonanticipative, α 0 (v 0 ) only depends on v 0 , but not on v 1 . We put u 0 := α 0 (v 0 ) and define, for u ∈ U t,T and
. Then β ∈ B t,T . Since α 1 ∈ A τ,T and β 1 ∈ B τ,T , by Lemma 3.6, we have the existence of a unique couple
On the other hand, for α ∈ A t,T and β ∈ B t,T , there exists a unique couple (u * , v * ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that α(v * ) = u * , β(u * ) = v * . Consequently,
From the uniqueness of (u * , v * ) it follows that
The latter estimate takes into account that we associated with β 1 a particular β,
, independently of α. Consequently,
Step 2: For all ε > 0, there exists α ε 1 ∈ A τ,T such that
For all β ∈ B t,T and an arbitrary fixed u 0 ∈ U t,τ , we define, for u 1 ∈ U τ,T and v ∈ V t,T ,
Then α ε ∈ A t,T and β 1 ∈ B τ,T .
Since α ε ∈ A t,T and β ∈ B t,T , by Lemma 3.6 we have the existence of a unique couple (u * , v * ) ∈ U t,T × V t,T such that α ε (v * ) = u * , β(u * ) = v * . On the other hand, from α ε 1 ∈ A τ,T and β 1 ∈ B τ,T it follows that there exists a unique couple (
dependents only on u 0 and not on u 1 . We put β 0 (u 0 ) = β(u 0 ⊕ u 1 )| [t,τ ] , u 0 ∈ U t,τ . Consequently, β 0 ∈ B t,τ , and
Due to the uniqueness of (u * , v * ) we obtain
, from which combined with (6.6) we get
For the second estimate we used that β 1 in (6.7) is defined with the help of β and, thus, runs only a subclass of B τ,T . The above both steps allow to conclude the proof. 
, for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ] × R n , and it can be checked in a straight-forward manner that for all discrete valued stopping times τ (0 ≤ τ ≤ T ), i = 1, 2,
Our objective is to extend this result to general stopping times. For this end we have to extend Proposition 3.10 and Theorem 6.1.
Similar to Proposition 3.10 we have from standard BSDEs estimates the following proposition.
Proposition 6.8. There exists a constant C > 0 such that, for all stopping time
The same property holds for U i .
Theorem 6.9. Let the assumptions (H4) and (H5) hold. Then the following dynamic programming principles hold: For any stopping times τ, η with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ η ≤ T, x ∈ R n , i = 1, 2,
8)
from where we conclude that also W i (τ, x) = W i (τ, x). Therefore,
From the above proposition and Proposition 6.10 we immediately have:
Proposition 6.12. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), there is some positive constant C such that, for any stopping times τ, η with 0 ≤ t < τ ≤ η ≤ T, x ∈ R n , where η is supposed to be σ(τ )−measurable, we have the following:
Theorem 3.11 follows from Proposition 6.11 and Theorem 6.9. We also have the following statement, which is a direct consequence of Proposition 6.11. Proposition 6.13. Under the assumptions (H4) and (H5), the following holds:
Proof of Theorem 4.2
Proof. We only give the proof for U = (U 1 , U 2 ), that for W = (W 1 , W 2 ) uses a similar argument. Let i = 1, 2 be arbitrarily fixed, (t, x) ∈ [0, T ) × R n , and δ > 0. We put τ δ = inf{s ≥ t, N
Let us consider the following BSDE on the interval [t, τ δ ] :
where X t,x;u,v is the solution of (3.1) with ζ = x ∈ R n . We notice that F (s, x, y, h, z, u, v) is Lipschitz in (y, h, z), uniformly in (s, x, u, v), and there exists a positive constant C such that
Consequently, BSDE (6.9) has a unique solution (Y 1,u,v , H 1,u,v , Z 1,u,v ). This solution obviously depends on δ, but for the sake of simplifying the notations we don't add δ as superscript to (Y 1,u,v , H 1,u,v , Z 1,u,v ). For the proof of Theorem 4.2, which extends the approaches in [5] and [7] to SDGs with jumps, we admit the following lemmas for the moment, they will be proven after.
Lemma 6.14. For every s ∈ [t, τ δ ], the following holds: (Recall that m(j) = 1, if j is odd, and m(j) = 2, if j is even.)
We also consider the following BSDE where, in equation (6.9), X t,x;u,v is substituted by its deterministic initial value where the constant C is independent of t, δ as well as of the control processes u, v.
Let us prove that U = (U 1 , U 2 ) is a viscosity solution of the system (4.1). We begin with showing that a) U = (U 1 , U 2 ) is a viscosity subsolution of the system (4.1). Let i = 1, 2 be arbitrarily fixed, and we suppose that U i ≤ ϕ and U i (t, x) = ϕ(t, x). We claim that Observe that, this claim just means that U = (U 1 , U 2 ) satisfies (4.3) of Definition 4.1; we will come back to this point. We make the proof by contradiction, and suppose that the above claim is not true. Then, thanks to the continuity of F , there exist some θ > 0, v * ∈ V and 0 < δ ′ ≤ T − t such that This together with (6.12), (6.13) and Lemma 6.16 yields −Cδ + f i (t, x, U 1 (t, x), U 2 (t, x), Dϕ(t, x)σ(t, x, u, v), u, v) , from where it follows that U = (U 1 , U 2 ) is a viscosity subsolution of the system (4.1).
b) Let us show that U = (U 1 , U 2 ) is also a viscosity supersolution of the system (4.1). Let i = 1, 2 be arbitrarily fixed, and we suppose that the test function ϕ is such that U i ≥ ϕ and U i (t, x) = ϕ(t, x). Then Hence, there exists β * ∈ B t,τ δ (depending on δ) such that From β * ∈ B t,τ δ it follows that there exists an increasing sequence of stopping times {S n (u)} n≥1 , for all u ∈ U t,τ δ , with t = S 0 (u) ≤ S 1 (u) ≤ · · · ≤ S n (u) ≤ · · · ≤ τ δ and n≥1 {S n (u) = τ δ } = Ω, P-a.s., such that, for all n ≥ 1 and u, u ′ ∈ U t,τ δ with u = u ′ on [[t, S n−1 (u)]], it holds S l (u) = S l (u ′ ), 1 ≤ l ≤ n, and β * (u) = β * (u ′ ), on [[t, S n (u)]]. On the other hand, defining α * (v) = u * on [t, τ δ ] × U t,τ δ , we deduce from (6.14) 
